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EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTIVITY: 
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF POLARIZATION AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 
IN A CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
Mike Kistner 
1 
Abstract: Despite a wealth of literature on the causes of gridlock in Congress, there is a lack of 
comparative work at the state level exploring whether lawmaking in state legislatures functions 
similarly. Operating under a theoretical framework assuming polarization and divided 
government are the primary obstacles to legislative success, and controlling for majority seat 
share, I test the determinants of legislative productivity with an original dataset consisting of 31 
states. I operationalize legislative productivity using a content analysis of editorials from each 
state during the 2009-2010 legislative sessions to identify pressing political issues, and then 
determine how many of these issues were addressed in some form of legislation during this 
period. Utilizing an improved measure of legislative productivity that weights issues by salience, 
I find that polarization's effects on productivity are conditioned by the presence or absence of 
divided government; during instances of unified government, polarization increases 
productivity, while this effect is negated under divided government. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, much has been written about the failure of the political system to simply 
get things done. The high profile government shutdown of 20 13, budgetary fighting and delays 
in state legislatures, and an increasingly hostile partisan atmosphere have all contributed to what 
has been characterized in the media as a political crisis. As a 2013 op-ed in the New York Times 
puts it, "the legislature has ceased to function" and claims that "what we're losing in the process 
isn't government -- it's democracy". 1 
While such claims might appear to be dramatized, they do point to a current lack of 
understanding about when and why government is successfully able to pass laws. What makes 
some legislatures effective and leaves others mired in gridlock? Political science literature has 
grappled with this question for almost 130 years, dating back to Woodrow Wilson's critical 
examination of the nation's primary legislature, Congressional Government. 
Despite the passage of time, a consensus has failed to emerge on the causes of political 
gridlock, despite a wealth of recent literature attempting to tackle the topic at the national level. 2 
There are numerous potential explanations, which include the effects of increasing polarization, 
1 Reich 2013, A23 
2 Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1992; Binder 1999; Jones 2001; Edwards et al. 1997; McCarty et al. 
2007; Ilderton 2008 
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the presence of divided government, and executive success or failure among others. Different 
authors espouse a belief that one or more such variables is the real cause, only to be rebutted by 
future research. Interestingly, a comparable literature at the subnational level has failed to 
develop, and there exists almost no multi state research to determine if state legislatures function 
(and fail to function) in similar ways to Congress (but note Gray and Lowery 1995, Bowling and 
Ferguson 2001). Currently, there exists no work examining both polarization and divided 
government - the two most important variables identified at the national level - that 
encompasses a majority of the states. 
This paper attempts to address this absence. By taking my cues from (and improving on) 
a method of identifying legislative agendas that has been used at the national level, I create two 
measures of state legislative productivity (one which treats all issues equally, and one which 
weighs each by salience) and apply these to 31 states during the period from 2009-2010. Then, 
by utilizing a recently created dataset that quantifies the ideological position of every state 
legislator, I am able to operationalize polarization as well as divided government, in order to 
determine their effects. Finally, I examine the impact of divided government and polarization at 
the state level, controlling for seat share, in an attempt to come to a better understanding of the 
conditions under which state legislatures succeed and fail at their most basic duty, the passage of 
laws. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
American political scientists have long attempted to isolate what drives legislative 
productivity, whether by examining Congress or state legislatures. This venture presents a two­
fold difficulty. The first part is determining what comprises legislative productivity. Some 
scholars have tackled the issue as a matter of how much important legislation passed. David 
Mayhew, in one of the most cited works on the subject, quantified gridlock in this manner.3 By 
looking at both contemporary commentary and retrospective judgments of what he termed 
"landmark" legislation, he was able to assign a raw score to congressional sessions to determine 
how productive or gridlocked each was. Others have looked at the converse, the amount of 
important legislation that did not pass.4 The limiting factor to such approaches is that these 
measures fail to take into account the differing agendas each session faced. For instance, 
3 Mayhew 1991 
4 Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997 
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moments such as the Second W orId War or the financial crisis of the late 1970s would seemingly 
provide a greater need (as well as opportunity) to pass legislation. An amount of legislation that 
would seem prodigious in less eventful times would then be expected. A more useful way to 
define productivity requires looking at a legislature's responsiveness to the political needs of the 
time, taking such exigencies into account. 
Some have devised measures that attempt to consider the issues faced by each legislature, 
typically by framing legislative productivity as a fractional score, with the number of relevant 
issues serving as the denominator, and the number of issues actually addressed as the numerator. 
One way this has been accomplished is by using the number of bills that made it to a particular 
stage of the lawmaking process, in order to construct a theoretical legislative agenda.5 This 
approach, however, runs the risk of failing to take into account the relative importance of each 
bill. Hearkening back to the previously mentioned definition, if the goal is to determine how 
responsive a legislature is to political needs it is certainly not the case that every bill that makes it 
out of committee necessarily represents a potent issue. In addition, the number of bills introduced 
or reaching a certain level of visibility is in itself potentially related to how much party conflict is 
present, making the independent variable subject to endogeneity problems. 
Other researchers have come up with ways to take into account both the needs faced by 
legislatures when lawmaking, as well as determining a level of salience. Binder, in her 1999 
work on gridlock in Congress6, uses a content analysis of newspaper editorials to provide a 
legislative agenda of issues considered important enough for a newspaper of record to bring to 
attention, whether in support of an action or against. Kousser utilizes a similar approach at the 
single-state level. 7 By setting a threshold of importance as well as determining agenda faced, this 
type of approach allows more meaningful comparisons to be made across time and location 
regardless of context. 
The second difficulty in investigating legislative productivity is deciding (and 
disentangling) which variables contribute to successful lawmaking. The primary determinants 
that researchers have focused on can be broadly categorized as inter-institutional conflict, or 
intra-institutional conflict. 
5 Bowling and Ferguson 2001; Ilderton 2008; Jones 2001 
6 See also her book length treatment on the same subject (2003) 
7 Kousser 2010 
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Inter-institutional conflict refers to the complicating effects that arise when the major 
players between one branch and another have distinct preferences. At its simplest, this can be 
viewed as divided control of government. When a president (or governor) is from one of the two 
major parties and one or both chambers of the legislature are controlled by the other party, does 
this present an obstacle to the passage of laws? In a Madisonian democracy of checks and 
balances, it would seem to make sense that when the two branches are controlled by actors with 
differing goals and interests, the process of lawmaking would be more difficult, requiring 
compromise, logrolling, and information sharing that isn't an issue if all major players have 
similar goals8. However, Mayhew, in a critical null finding, provided an analysis of 44 years of 
Congress which found no link between divided government and legislative productivity. Since 
then, numerous scholars have produced empirical evidence contrary to Mayhew's findings 
pointing to divided government being an obstacle to legislative efficiency at the national level. 9 
Alternatively, others have confirmed Mayhew's results. 10 
While less literature exists at the state level, the debate also seems to extend to the state 
legislatures. Though they only examine legislative activity in a single state, Kousser and 
Cummins both conclude that divided government presented a barrier to the passage of bills and 
budgets in California. 11 Bowling and Ferguson examine all fifty states, measuring gridlock as a 
simple percentage of how many bills became laws and how many failed to, and find divided 
government to be a statistically significant factor. 12 On the other hand, in examining legislative 
activity in 46 of the states, Gray and Lowery found a nonexistent relationship between divided 
governmental control and law passage. 13 Despite widely differing results, all of these authors 
consider the presence of inter-institutional conflict an important point of analysis. 
The second primary lens through which to consider gridlock is intra-branch conflict; 
specifically, factors within the legislature that prevent it from functioning properly. This 
discussion has mostly centered on polarization, or the width of the ideological differences 
8 Such a process also seems to be more likely to break down completely. For over thirty years, 
political scientists have observed that vetoes are more common under divided government both 
at the national (Rohde and Simon 1985) and state (Wiggins 1980) level. 
9 Binder 1999; Ilderton 2008; and Edwards, Barrett and Peake 1997 
10 Fiorina 1992; Jones 2001 
11 Kousser 2010; Cummins 2012 
12 Bowling and Ferguson 2001 
13 Gray and Lowery 1995 
between the two parties. 14 Why should polarization affect legislative productivity? For some, 
polarization's effect is a general one; the more ideologically distant the members making up an 
institution, the less successful it will be. As Binder puts it, "The broader the distribution of 
preferences, the greater the likelihood that legislator's goals will be incompatible, or at least the 
more difficult it will be to reach a suitable compromise.,,15 Polarization, therefore, can pose 
individual level difficulties, but perhaps the greatest threat of polarization is the conflict it 
encourages in the parties. As the theory of conditional party government suggests, parties in a 
legislature that are further apart ideologically have more incentive to strengthen party 
government and oppose the other party more vigorously. 16 Logically, as polarization increases, 
the minority party will have more incentive to oppose the majority party's actions, complicating 
the passage of laws. 17 
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However, it should be noted that the effects of polarization on the legislative process may 
differ based on institutional factors. Due to a number of blocking tactics available for the 
minority party to use in the United States Senate (filibuster, legislative holds, non-germane 
amendments), researchers have noted that a highly divided Senate may suffer more under 
polarization than the House does.18 It has even been suggested that due to the relative ease with 
which a House majority can pass an agenda, the increased ideological cohesion that comes with 
polarization may make the House more productive. 19 In fact, others have suggested that 
polarization can perhaps counterintuitively have positive effects on the lawmaking process. Dodd 
and Schraufnagel have suggested that due to intraparty cohesion, increased competitive pressure, 
and legislator civility, polarization might have a curvilinear relation with legislative productivity, 
where too little polarization can be as harmful as too much.2o Likewise, when one takes the 
conditional party government theory to its logical conclusion, while increased polarization might 
14 But note Gray and Lowery 1995 as well as Bowling and Ferguson 2001, who suggest that the 
proliferation of interest groups and the conflict between them is significant too. 
15 Binder 1999, 521 
16 Aldrich 1995, Aldrich and Rohde 1996 
17 Worth noting, however, Dodd and Schraufnagel suggest that due to increased competitive 
pressure and intraparty cohesion, polarization might have a curvilinear relationship with 
legislative productivity, where the ideal amount is moderate polarization, and too far to either 
extreme results in diminishing returns (2008). In my analysis, I take into account this possibility. 
18  Sinclair 2008, Jones 2001 
19 Ilderton 2008 
20 Dodd and Schraufnagel 2008 
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increase the incentives for parties to draw closer together and oppose each other more 
vigorously, it also might imply that if polarization is paired with large enough legislative 
majorities to prevent minority interference, the increased cohesion and incentives for the majority 
party might lead to greater productivity. Thus, it's important to take majority party seat control 
into account as a potential explanatory variable as well. While polarization may have both 
positive and negative effects on legislative productivity, insofar as it is a matter of pitting the 
majority party against the minority party, the balance of power between the two remains a 
critical factor. 
Notably, few have considered the confluence of polarization and divided government. 
Polarization's effects may be tampered by whether interparty bargaining is required between a 
governor and all or part of a legislature. Conversely, if polarization does enhance productivity in 
some manner, it seems much more likely to occur when the governorship and the legislature are 
controlled by the same party. McCarty hypothesizes this precise relationship at the national 
leve1.21 
These three variables are not a comprehensive list, as other possible factors in legislative 
productivity have also been investigated.22 However, these are the primary potential explanations 
that scholars have focused on thus far, coming to few undisputed conclusions. 
In light of this, a number of things are clear. First, such contradictory results at all levels 
on the relationship between both inter- and intra-institutional conflict and legislative productivity 
leave us with a muddled picture on how such factors affect the lawmaking process. Any further 
research into the phenomenon of gridlock can only help clarify what is now a disputed area. 
Secondly, while the effects of divided government have been studied at the state level in a 
comparative context, there is no current equivalent research concerning the effects of 
polarization on legislative activity in the states. As Layman, Carsey and Horowitz detail at the 
end of their summary on political polarization, "particularly helpful would be comparative work 
at both the subnational and cross-national levels, where variations in policy, partisan, 
institutional, and cultural contexts may shape the beneficial or harmful consequences of party 
21 McCarty 2007 
22 For instance, legislative professionalism (Gray and Lowery 1995, Clarke 1998); or extra­
institutional constraints such as having an initiative process (Cummins 2012, Hicks 2013). 
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polarization.,,23 Considering this, the benefits are numerous of a multi-state examination of 
legislative productivity taking both inter-institutional and intra-institutional conflict into account; 
not only will it help illuminate the role of polarization in how legislatures function at the state 
level, but it also allows an evaluation of how divided government and polarization work as 
variables across a number of varying institutional and environmental contexts, in a way that 
looking at Congress or a single state alone does not allow. If inter- and intra-institutional conflict 
has a universal effect, a study looking at a large cross-section of US states should bring us closer 
towards properly determining those effects. This paper attempts to address this gap in the 
literature by systematically looking at the relative influence of these two factors, and presents 
evidence that at the state level that both have significant (though conditional) effects on 
legislative productivity. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to evaluate these claims, it is necessary to operationalize legislative productivity, 
polarization, and divided government. The most difficult step is coming up with a valid measure 
of legislative productivity during 2009-2010, the time period under examination. 
Attempts to come up with such a measurement in previous multi state research have 
primarily utilized a simple measure of total bill passage rate.24 The problem with such an 
approach is that simply taking the passage rate of all bills mandates the inclusion of a large 
number of minor legislative actions, as well as failing to capture whether or not a state legislature 
addressed what were considered the important political issues at the time. 
Instead, my measure of legislative productivity draws from Sarah Binder's methodology 
in "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock".25 Binder measured gridlock by going through the 
editorial pages of The New York Times, coding the policy demands of every editorial mentioning 
Congress, the House, or the Senate. She then created a measure of gridlock by taking the number 
of issues that failed to result in the passage of laws, and turning it into a percentage, with the 
total number of issues discussed in the editorial pages representing the denominator. She decides 
to only include issues with four or more editorial mentions in her analysis, to provide a floor for 
23 Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006, 105 
24 Gray and Lowery 1995, Bowling and Ferguson 2001 
25 The use of this method at the state level is not without precedent; in his single state analysis of 
gridlock in California, Kousser uses a similar measure as Binder to draw conclusions on the 
effects of polarization (2010). 
salience.26 
The benefit of such an approach is that it focuses on what political commentators at the 
time deemed important enough to discuss publicly, rather than merely looking at all bills 
considered as other researchers have done. This comes closer to the real concern when 
discussing legislative productivity: determining which legislatures can most effectively respond 
to the political necessities of the time. For example, an average state might pass 800 new laws 
per year.27 On the other hand, my content analysis of newspaper editorials turned up an average 
of 29 unique issues for each state which were considered important enough to discuss in an 
editorial. 
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However, while Binder's method recognizes this importance threshold by examining 
only those issues salient enough to be discussed in the media, it fails to take into account the 
relative importance of each issue once the threshold has been passed. A better measure would be 
one that is able to distinguish between issue importance at an interval level (rather than treat all 
issues past an arbitrary point of salience the same), and incorporate that into a legislative 
productivity score. 
In order to accomplish this, I go through each of the 31 states, and using a newspaper of 
record for each state (choosing the newspaper with the largest circulation available from two 
online databases28), I analyze every unsigned editorial containing the term "state legislature", or 
alternatively, the specific name for the state (for example, searching in The Chicago Tribune for 
Illinois using "General Assembly"). I then create a dataset listing all the unique issues, including 
the number of editorials each issue are mentioned in throughout the two year period.29 Following 
this, I utilize websites maintained by the individual state legislatures themselves, contemporary 
news reports, and Lexis-N exis to determine which of the issues were addressed in some manner 
in a bill that passed through both chambers and was signed into law. I make no attempt to judge 
the quality of the laws, or how closely they came to an ideal version that either the editorial staff 
at the newspaper or legislators at the statehouse wanted. Rather, it is simply a measure of 
26 In both her 1999 and 2003 works, she does run the tests with different threshold levels, with 
mostly the same results. 
27 MSNBC 2011 
28 ProQuest National Newspapers Premiere and Lexis-Nexis 
29 See Appendix A for coding procedure. 
whether the legislature was able to pass a law that was closely related to the specific problem 
identified in the editorial pages. 
U sing this, I derive two measures, depending on whether the unit of analysis is a unique 
issue, or an issue mention, counting each mention of an issue in a different editorial separately. 
Table 1 provides the average number of unique issues and issue mentions per state. While the 
mean number of mentions each issue received was only 1.8, there was significant variation. At 
the high end, one issue was mentioned in 22 separate editorials over the two year period. 
The first measure I use is essentially the method used by Binder in her analysis, which I 
term Simple Legislative Productivity. This score considers how effective the legislature was at 
dealing with all of the issues faced during the time period, without considering their relative 
importance. It is assumed that if the issue was important enough for an editorial to be written 
concerning the matter, the issue represented a problem to be faced. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for unique issues and issue mentions per state 
Mean Low High Standard Dev. 
Unique Issues 28.5 11 69 31.0 
Issue Mentions 52.0 12 118 14.8 
9 
N=31 
The second measure, which I refer to as Weighted Legislative Productivity, weighs each 
issue differently depending on how many editorials mentioned the issue.3o This measure takes 
into account the salience of each issue; perhaps a state that is hampered by divided government 
or polarization cannot deal with the same number of issues, but it can still address the most 
pressing problems of the day. By using both measures of productivity, this approach allows such 
a distinction to be made and penalizes such a legislature less severely than one that addresses 
problems at random. 
30 To provide an example, if the issue of same-sex civil unions was mentioned in three editorials, 
for the first measure I would code simply whether a law was passed concerning same-sex civil 
unions, and it would represent one success among the total number of issues that had the 
potential of being addressed in law. For the second measure, I would code that as three 
successes, among the total number of issues by story mention that potentially could have been 
addressed in law. 
This method has the benefit of identifying the most politically salient issues, as well as 
going beyond a simple count of important legislation in a Mayhew-esque manner, which 
theoretically would be greater in larger state legislatures as compared to smaller ones. The 
methodology I utilize attempts to determine how much states had on their agendas during the 
time period studied, and then how much of that agenda they were able to respond to, a basic 
definition of legislative success. 
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Furthermore, because the content and quality of the law is not what is being measured, 
fears of partisan sympathies on the part of the newspaper under question should not be an issue; 
as Mayhew described it in his work on divided government, a newspaper need not agree with an 
issue to deem it important enough to write about. 31 On a theoretical level, editorials represent a 
sort of communal conversation about the political situations of the time, and just like a political 
conversation between people, topics will include both issues an editorial board supports and 
opposes. My coding scheme looked only at what editorials were talking about, not what they 
wanted. I also create a dummy variable utilizing the newspaper slant scores developed by 
Shapiro and Gentzkow to use in my analysis, coded positively if the newspaper I use is biased 
towards the party in control of the legislature.32 
The next step is quantifying the independent variables, polarization, divided government 
and majority party seat control. To operationalize polarization, I use the data from the ideal space 
estimation model created by Shor and McCarty.33 The two are able to map state legislators on a 
single-dimensional ideological spectrum utilizing roll call voting and survey responses from 
legislators both at the national and state level, allowing one to compare standardized scores for 
legislators across time and chambers. By comparing the difference in party ideological medians 
within each chamber and averaging the two, I come up with a measure of polarization for each 
state legislature. While my primary unit of analysis will be the state legislatures themselves, the 
ability to aggregate individual preferences into a total score that is directly comparable with other 
state legislatures (as well as Congress) provides a more precise measure of polarization than 
previous attempts at quantifying the concept. 34 I conduct my analysis of state legislatures for the 
31 Mayhew 1991,43 
32 Shapiro and Gentzkow 2010 
33 Shor and McCarty 2011 
34 Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993, Berry et al. 1998 
biennium from 2009 to 2010, since that is the most recent period that the majority of states had 
polarization data available.35 
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I then test whether polarization has the theorized negative effects, conditional on the 
presence of divided government, coded as a dummy variable (0 if one party controls both the 
governorship and both chambers of the legislature, 1 if otherwise). My first hypothesis is that 
polarization should have a negative effect on legislative productivity when combined with 
divided government, and either no effect or a positive effect during unified government. I also 
hypothesize that greater majority seat share (coded as the percent of seats in each chamber the 
largest party in the state controls, averaged across chambers) will likewise allow a majority party 
to accomplish more of its legislative agenda. This should occur regardless of divided 
government. Under divided government, greater majority size should lead to increased likelihood 
of a veto override, and even under unified government a larger seat share prevents the minority 
party from making effective use of blocking mechanisms. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I measure the legislative productivity of 31 states, 
and then assess the impact of polarization, divided government, and majority party seat share. 
My initial list of 31 states is diverse in population, average income, geographical location, and 
ideology.36 Particularly, I wanted a mix of divided versus unified control of government. Table 2 
provides the relative frequencies of divided government for all state legislatures from 2009-
2010,37 compared to my sample of 31. In addition, 13 of the states in my sample were below the 
median level of polarization, and 18 were above. Unfortunately, for four out of the eight states 
that had divided partisan control of the two chambers, no newspaper sources were available in 
the databases used, preventing me from being fully able to test whether having a unified 
legislature against the party of the governor had a differential effect on legislative productivity 
than a divided legislature. 
35 Because the dataset is an ongoing work, for 12 of the 31 states the 2009-2010 data wasn't 
complete. For these states, I utilize the closest year with complete data before 2009, which was 
2008 for all 12 states. Because the ideological medians change gradually over a large number of 
years, this shouldn't significantly affect the results. 
36 For a full list of the states examined, as well as further descriptive statistics, see Appendix B. 
37 Excluding Nebraska, a unicameral legislature which for comparability purposes is excluded 
from consideration in my analysis. 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of partisan control of government, all states (excl. Nebraska) 
compared to sample 
All states 31 state sample 
Unified Government 26 (53%) 19 (61%) 
Divided Branches Only 15 (31 %) 8 (26%) 
Divided Chambers 8 (16%) 4 (13%) 
Total 49 (100%) 27 (100%) 
I create legislative productivity scores for each state, both the previously used simple 
legislative productivity, as well as the weighted productivity score which takes into account the 
relative salience of each issue and how effectively each legislature was able to deal with these 
more important issues. Notably, while there is some difference, the two measures track each 
other very closely; the Pearson's r for the simple and weighted scores is a .903, indicating that 
the weighted legislative productivity score is a valid alternative measure of productivity. In 
addition, the agenda size is not correlated with how efficient a legislature was at responding to 
issues; when either the number of issues or the number of issue mentions are inserted into the 
main regression, neither variable is significant. As shown in Table 3, the only significant 
correlations with unique issues and issue mentions were population size and average income, 
suggesting that the more people (and how relatively affluent they were) were the main 
determinants behind a larger agenda size. 
Table 3. Bivariate Correlations between Unique Issues/Issue Mentions per state and 
demographic data 
Pearson Correlation 
Total Average Annual Income 
Population 
Number of Unique Issues .389* .421 * 
Number of Issue Mentions .358* .435* 
*p<.05, ** p<.Ol N=31 
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Furthermore, when a variable is created indicating whether the legislature is controlled by 
the same party that the newspaper is biased towards, neither the simple nor weighted score is 
13 
significantly correlated with the slant benefit, providing additional confidence in the accuracy of 
the measure.38 
With both of these legislative productivity scores, it is then possible to develop a series of 
ordinary least squares regression models to estimate the impacts of divided government, 
polarization, and majority party seat share, as well as the interaction between divided 
government and polarization. Table 4 reports the coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) and 
two-tailed significance of the aforementioned variables using both the simple and weighted 
productivity scores as a dependent variable. 
Table 4. OLS models of simple and weighted legislative productivity 
Independent Variables 
Majority Party Seat 
Share 
Polarization 
Divided Government 
Divided Government 
and Polarization 
Interaction 
AdjustedR2 
*p<.05 
**p<.Ol 
Dependent Variable 
Simple Legislative Weighted Legislative 
Productivity Productivity 
.440* .632* 
(.204) (.240) 
.156* .210** 
(.060) (.071) 
.168 .219 
(.127) (.149) 
-.203* -.248* 
(.080) (.094) 
.419 .443 
n=31 
The results from the two specifications of the model using the separate measures of 
legislative productivity are quite similar, not unexpected given the close correlation between the 
38 Pearson Correlationp-values between slant benefit and the two scores are .305 and .314 
respecti vel y. 
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two scores but providing additional confidence in the robustness of the results. In addition a 
Goldfeld-Quandt test for heteroscedasticity fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity,39 providing assurance that the varying amount of issue mentions in the 
weighted legislative productivity model isn't affecting the results of the regression. While the 
findings from both specifications of the model are similar, the R2 of the weighted legislative 
productivity model is slightly higher, the magnitude of the coefficients is greater for each 
variable, and polarization registers at a higher level of significance than the simple legislative 
productivity model, suggesting that taking relative issue salience into account provides a similar 
but "improved picture of legislative productivity. 
Turning to the hypotheses, all three variables have statistically significant effects, with 
the coefficients in the expected direction, although divided government only has an effect 
through its interaction with polarization. When divided government is not present and coded as 
zero, the interaction term drops out of the equation and polarization actually has a significant 
positive effect on legislative productivity. Polarization in the states can under certain 
circumstance prove beneficial to the legislative process; namely, when both chambers and the 
governor are controlled by a single party. This effect is bolstered by large majority size, as the 
positive coefficient in front of majority party seat share demonstrates. High levels of 
polarization, as some in the literature have suggested, can provide greater incentive for majorities 
to enact their desired agendas. When the ideological distance between them and the minority 
party is large, legislative victories become more meaningful (as the alternative option is further 
from their desired position). In addition, as Aldrich and Rohde's theory implies, under times of 
greater polarization parties have greater internal cohesion and organization, making large-scale 
legislative efforts possible. However, under divided government, the positive effects of 
polarization are negated - combining the coefficients for polarization and the interaction term 
reveals it actually has a small negative effect on legislative productivity. A smaller majority seat 
share hurts this as well. Not only does there have to be incentive for legislative action, but the 
majority party needs the capacity to enact policy as well, and divided government and a more 
powerful minority limit this. Finally, divided government's lack of a significant effect as an 
individual variable reveals that divided government, absent polarization, fails to present a 
substantial obstacle to legislative productivity. 
39 95% confidence level; Fc=5.0 
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This result could help explain the discrepancy between Mayhew's 1991 null finding on 
the relation between divided government and gridlock, and later analyses that have demonstrated 
such a link exists. As many political scientists have noted,40 elite polarization started rapidly 
increasing during the 1990s and has continued on to today, where it remains at a high point 
unreached since the turn of the previous century. Assuming that the findings from this cross­
sectional model of legislatures would apply similarly to Congress, the recent increase in 
polarization would lead directly to less productive instances of divided government compared to 
unified government, a difference that would not have occurred in times of less polarization. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis provides strong support for the idea that it is critical to take into 
account not just inter-institutional conflict (divided government) and intra-institutional conflict 
(polarization), but also the ways that the two interact with each other. When polarization is low, 
the difference for a legislature between negotiating with a governor from the opposite party 
versus the same party is relatively minor, and thus low levels of inter-institutional conflict mean 
divided government has little consequence for legislative productivity. However, when elite 
polarization is high, negotiating across party lines becomes more conflictual. Conflict is not all 
bad, however; in times of unified government, the higher stakes posed by polarized conditions 
can lead to greater incentives for the majority party to enact broad swathes of legislation. This is 
especially true when the majority party has a larger number of seats under its control in the 
legislature, as the minority party has fewer options available to block the majority's agenda. 
This paper does what others have not - testing polarization's effects broadly across policy 
areas, taking into account issue salience and weighting accordingly, and looking at a large 
sample of the state legislatures. Worth noting is that Kousser, who similarly uses a methodology 
based on Binder's, found in his single-state analysis that polarization alone fails to lead to any 
decrease in productivity, but that the combined presence of polarization and divided government 
are when gridlock is most likely to occur.41 This research provides empirical evidence that a 
similar effect can be found in a majority of the states. 
Another important innovation this paper provides that can be utilized in future research 
on legislative productivity is the idea that measuring productivity using a graded scale of issue 
40 Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006; McCarty 2007; Shor and McCarty 2011 
41 Kousser 2010 
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salience allows for a more accurate modeling of real world legislatures. While the difference is 
small, the model utilizing such a weighted measure does a better job of explaining the variation 
in legislative productivity than the previously used simple measure does, and is more sensitive to 
the effects of the explanatory variables. More importantly, on a theoretical basis, it allows for 
one to make distinctions between the relatively minor agenda issues that may surface briefly, and 
the major policy issues that can represent the primary goals of an entire legislative session. 
Despite this improvement, even the model using weighted legislative productivity is only able to 
explain approximately half of the variance in productivity; while this might be unsurprising 
given the state-specific factors that likely exist, it also indicates that significantly more work 
investigating the determinants of legislative productivity is necessary. 
Finally, this research only looks at a relatively short time period of two years, so it is 
possible that in different time periods inter-institutional and intra-institutional factors have 
different effects on legislative productivity. While perhaps there were stresses on the legislative 
system following a recession, or some other idiosyncrasy of this era played a role, a different 
method enabling the study of state level legislative productivity both over time and across states 
could help negate these concerns. 
Absent more solid evidence to call these findings into doubt, however, this paper 
provides solid evidence for a more nuanced view of how polarization can operate, both 
positively and negatively, and the role divided government plays in that determination. By taking 
into account both inter- and intra-institutional conflict and ways the two concepts work together, 
it is possible to come to a clearer understanding of the primary obstacles to legislative 
productivity. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Issue Coding Procedure 
When coding individual issues to create my legislative productivity scores for each 
state, I created a spreadsheet for each particular state. I search the newspaper identified for 
each state from the time period of January 1, 2009, to the end of the legislative session for that 
particular state (interpreting any editorials passed after that time period as issues highlighted 
for the next session to deal with). When the legislature in question met year round, I chose the 
cutoff point of November 243 to scan editorials, to be certain I didn't unfairly penalize full­
time legislatures from being unable to respond to an issue brought up by an editorial at the end 
of December. The legislature in that case might have passed a law dealing with that issue 
during the first week of January, for example - as the legislature meets regularly, there's no 
need to get it accomplished immediately. Contrast that with a legislature whose session ends in 
May and doesn't begin again until the following year. An issue left undealt with before the 
end of the session won't be passed for several more months, representing an unaddressed 
political need. 
I then limit my searches to editorials and opinions (an option in both databases), and 
search for whatever the name is of the state legislature in question (for example, the General 
Assembly in Pennsylvania). I only include unsigned editorials representing the opinions of 
the entire editorial board - I ignore letters to the editor or personal commentary, in order to 
only capture views that correspond to the considered opinion of multiple people as important 
to the state. The number returned through this method ranged from a few dozen to over 500. 
I engaged in a content analysis, looking for issues that 1) were political in nature, 
2) were identified as a problem on the state level or was under the authority of the state 
legislature to deal with (as opposed to Congress or local government) and 3) was specific 
enough in nature as to name a discrete problem or solution. I then put down the date of the 
editorial, as well as any mention of specific bills, sponsors, or committees, to assist in later 
determining whether the issue was addressed in law. 
I also kept track of how many times an issue was mentioned - any time a future 
editorial returned to the same issue, I increased this number by one for each separate 
43 Nattonal election day, as well as date of most state legislature elections 
editorial an issue was mentioned in. In determining whether an issue raised by a 
subsequent editorial was the same as a previous issue, I made a decision in the 
following manner: 
1) Did the editorial mention the same bill or sponsor/issue combination as a 
previous editorial? If yes, code as the same issue. 
2) Did the editorial describe an issue that mentioned specific details in 
common with a previous issue, on a related subject (i.e., the same 
university system, a specific place or business, etc.)? If yes, code as the 
same Issue 
3) Did the editorial describe an issue that was similar in nature to a previous 
issue, and fail to mention any specific details that were contrasting to the 
previous time the issue was mentioned (i.e., a different education system, a 
different type of place or business, etc.)? If yes, code as the same issue. 
If none of the above qualifications were met, I then coded the reference as 
separate issue, and continued from there. 
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There were three categories of issues raised that I chose not to include in my analysis: 
budgets, tax increases/decreases, and appropriations. The first I chose not to include because 
all states must pass a budget, at some point, and therefore to include calls for a budget (which 
were mostly qualitative in nature, rather than mere hope that something got passed) would be 
invariably coded as passed at the end. One potential work around would have been to code 
whether a budget got passed on time, for those states with a hard deadline, but this too led to 
ambiguities - in some states, sessions were extended by the governor to give the legislature 
more time to pass a budget. Would this be a failure, or a success? Rather than engage in 
interpretation, I chose to exclude the matter altogether. 
The other two types of issues, tax increases/decreases and appropriations, I chose not 
to include for a number of reasons. First off, appropriations and taxation also occur invariably. 
Any judgment of success or failure must then rest on how much of an increase or decrease in 
taxation or funding represented a successful policy enactment. Calls for additional money to a 
specific department or purpose are especially hard to evaluate - perhaps funding levels 
increase minimally, in keeping with inflation, while not representing any additional resources 
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available to that department. Is this a success? Again, choosing to limit the subjective 
interpretation necessary in such a coding procedure, I chose not to examine the matter 
whatsoever. In contrast, calls for the outright institution or abolishment of a tax or department, 
I did code for. Here, there is a bright line. For example, if an editorial called for the creation of 
a cigarette tax, either a tax was created, or it wasn't. 
This latter exemption to the rule should mitigate concerns that my analysis excluded 
financial matters altogether. I did code for tax requests, tax abolishment requests, the creation 
and removal of sections of government, as well as specific financial matters that were discrete 
and easily ascertainable whether they got passed or not - for example, a job creation subsidy 
package for a specific industry. 
F or the last part of the procedure, I determined if each specific issue was addressed in 
law or not. In order to do this, my primary resource was websites maintained by the state 
legislatures themselves that in almost every case had a searchable database of bills from the 
time period in question. I would then either search by bill number or sponsor name (if 
provided), or search utilizing terms related to each issue, and evaluate whether passed laws 
contained specific requests mentioned in the editorial to decide whether they represented a 
response to the particular issue coded. If 
I found a law that was passed by the legislature and signed by the governor, I coded it as a 
success. If I found a bill that was specifically mentioned by an editorial, but failed to pass, I 
coded it as a failure. 
When this process was unable to return any suitable results, I then searched Lexis-Nexis 
for legal briefs for the time period in question, and also searched contemporary media 
accounts for any mention of a law that fit the characterization of the issue in the editorial 
mention. If all of these options failed to tum up any laws passed dealing with the issue in 
question, I coded it as a failure. 
Appendix B: State Scores and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to be certain my sample of states is representative, I include the following 
table of descriptive statistics (in addition to table 1 on page 14, which displays the 
breakdown of state legislatures by partisan control of government). 
Table 5. Average J2QPulation, incometJJ!1fil!-olarization 50 US states versus 31 state sample 
Average Annual 
Income 
Between Ideological 
Medians (Polariz.) 
All states 31 state sample 
6,128,000 7,565,000 
$37,733 $38,287 
1.448 1.509 
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The following are the simple and weighted legislative productivity scores of each 
state, arranged from highest weighted legislative productivity to least. 
Table 6. Simple and weighted legislative productivity 
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State Simple Legislative Productivity Weighted legislative Productivity 
Utah 52.4% 69.7% 
New Mexico 67.7% 68.8% 
Rhode Island 57.9% 67.5% 
Idaho 63.6% 66.7% 
Colorado 55.1% 64.9% 
Texas 50.0% 64.8% 
Wisconsin 50.0% 61.3% 
North Dakota 59.1% 59.3% 
Maryland 57.7% 59.2% 
North Carolina 43.8% 56.0% 
New York 53.1% 54.0% 
West Virginia 37.5% 48.7% 
New Jersey 42.4% 46.7% 
Massach usetts 36.2% 44.9% 
Missouri 27.6% 44.7% 
Maine 42.1% 42.3% 
Oklahoma 43.5% 41.9% 
Florida 40.0% 39.3% 
New Hampshire 33.3% 37.9% 
Virginia 43.2% 37.8% 
Minnesota 37.5% 37.1% 
South Dakota 38.9% 35.0% 
California 29.1% 33.8% 
Wyoming 30.8% 33.3% 
Kentucky 25.0% 31.0% 
Kansas 37.5% 30.0% 
Georgia 33.3% 24.1% 
Illinois 30.8% 23.4% 
Mississippi 27.3% 23.1% 
Pennsylvania 12.5% 20.0% 
Ohio 10.0% 7.4% 
